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A companion paper, Sanchirico (1996a), provides a probabilistic theory of
learning in games with the convergence property that, almost surely, play will
remain almost always (i.e., forever after some point) within one of the stage
game's "minimal inclusive sets." This paper investigates the size of minimal
inclusive sets in several classes of games, notably, those for which other learning
processes have been shown to converge (in various manners weaker than
convergence of actual play). These include certain supermodular games,
congestion games, potential games, games with identical interests, and games
with bandwagon effects. It is shown that in all these classes, if all of a game's
pure equilibria are strict {a fortiori, if its payoffs are generic), then all of its
minimal inclusive sets will be singletons consisting of Nash equilibria.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, much research has been directed toward formalizing the intuition that common
knowledge of strategic intent may arise from repeated interaction.2 In this vein, Sanchirico
(1996) provides a probabilistic theory of learning in games (in a repeated game framework) with
the convergence property that, almost surely, play will remain almost always (i.e., forever after
some point) within one of the stage game's "minimal inclusive sets3" An "inclusive set"
(DEFINITION 1; following Basu and Weibull4 (1991)) is a rectangular subset of action profiles
with the property that each player's factor includes all best responses to beliefs on the product of
her opponents' factors. A minimal inclusive set (DEFINITION 2) is an inclusive set that contains
no other inclusive set.
One of the two key assumptions that generate convergence in Sanchirico (1996) is a best
response based noise assumption designed to reflect the indeterminacy of strategic interaction.
One byproduct of this assumption is that convergence to any strict subset of a minimal inclusive
set is impossible. According to the theory of learning in that paper, therefore, the potency of the
learning approach to generate common knowledge of strategic intent varies across games
according to the size of the game's minimal inclusive sets. The range of size of these sets is
large. In some games, such as matching pennies, the only minimal inclusive set will be the entire
set of (rationalizable5) profiles. In others, such as the battle of the sexes, all minimal inclusive
sets will be pure strategy Nash equilibria.
This paper investigates the size of minimal inclusive sets in various classes of games.
Special attention is paid to the several classes for which other learning processes have been
shown to converge (in various manners weaker than convergence of actual play). These include,
first, (certain) supermodular games (Krishna (1990)), congestion games (Rosenthal (1973)),
potential games and games with identical interests (Monderer and Shapley (1993a and b)). In
these the beliefs generated by fictitious play have been shown to converge to a mixed
equilibrium of the stage game. Also considered are games with bandwagon effects (Kandori and
Sanchirico 2 Minimal Inclusive Sets
Rob (1992)), in which the limit population distribution in the evolutionary model of Kandori and
Rob (1992a) concentrates on a (particular) pure equilibrium. It is shown that in all such classes,
if all of a game's pure equilibria are strict6 {a fortiori, if its payoffs are generic), then all of the
game's minimal inclusive sets will be singletons consisting of strict equilibria.
The paper, therefore, accomplishes two tasks. In the first place, it shows that within the
foregoing classes of games the probabilistic learning model in Sanchirico (1996a) generates
convergence of actual play to Nash equilibrium. But apart from its connection to Sanchirico
(1996a), the paper has interest in its own right in that it helps to tie together the growing
menagerie of seemingly disparate classes of games for which positive convergence results have
been obtained.
In broad outline, what these classes have in common are two important properties. The
first is that all games within these classes have pure strategy equilibria. The second is that the
properties that define these classes are "restrictable" to any one of the game's inclusive sets: that
is, for any (rectangular) inclusive set, /, in any game G with the property, the game G{, with
strategy space /and payoffs equal to the restriction of G's payoffs to /, also has the property.
(Supermodular games are not restrictable and we will have to modify the definition slightly to
make them so.) This in turn implies that for each inclusive set /, the restricted game G7 has a
pure strategy equilibrium. By the definition "inclusive set," such an equilibrium must also be an
equilibrium in G. If all pure equilibria in G are strict, each inclusive set will contain a strict
equilibrium in G. But such strict equilibria are themselves inclusive sets. Hence, no minimal
inclusive set can be other than a singleton consisting of a pure, strict equilibrium. This argument
is formalized in THEOREM 1 (Template).
The work in this paper extends the research reported in Basu and Weibull (1991). That
paper defines and establishes certain properties of inclusive sets and minimal inclusive sets.
These are: /) the existence of minimal inclusive sets in a broad class of games (existence is
trivial in the finite games that I consider here); ii) the "tightness" of minimal inclusive sets~the
fact that the inclusive property holds with (set) equality for these sets; Hi) the fact that every
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compact inclusive set contains the support of a Nash equilibrium; and iv) the fact that the set of
rationalizable profiles is the largest "tight" inclusive set7. Basu and Weibull (1991) does not
investigate the size of minimal inclusive sets in various classes of games. Nor does it discuss the
application of such sets to the context of learning in games.
After presenting the general result discussed above in SECTION 2,1 turn in SECTION 3 to
the relationship between minimal inclusive sets and mixed equilibria. Then in SECTION 4,1 take
up supermodular games ((DEFINITION 6; Topkis (1978), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts
(1990), Milgrom and Shannon (1991)). Milgrom and Roberts (1991) have shown that if a
supermodular game has a unique equilibrium, then any sequence consistent with "sophisticated
learning8" will converge to that equilibrium. Since supermodular games do not, in general, have
unique equilibria (e.g., battle of the sexes), and since, when they do, such an equilibrium will be
the game's only serially undominated strategy (Milgrom and Roberts (1990) Theorem 5 and
Corollary), this convergence result does not directly address the question of whether learning
models can show the formation of common knowledge of strategic intent, given common
knowledge of rationality. Krishna (1991), however, has shown that in a particular subclass of
supermodular games—those with completely ordered action spaces and "diminishing" increasing
dif and only iferences—the sequence of beliefs generated by fictitious play9 (whose corresponding
sequence of play will be consistent with sophisticated learning) will converge to one of the
game's mixed equilibria. In SECTION 4,1 show, inter alia, that in all supermodular games with
generic payoffs10 in which each minimal inclusive set is a supermodular game in its own right
(which will be the case if action spaces are completely ordered), all minimal inclusive sets will
be singletons consisting of strict equilibria (COROLLARY 2).
More recently, Monderer and Shapley (1993 a and b) have investigated the properties of
fictitious play in "potential games," (which include Rosenthal's (1973) "congestion games") and
games "with identical interests11" (DEFINITIONS 9 and 14, respectively). These authors show in
Monderer and Shapley (1993 a) that in games with identical interests, the beliefs generated by
fictitious play converge to a mixed equilibrium of the game. In Monderer and Shapley (1993b),
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it is noted that the class of games with identical interests includes the class of "weighted"
potential games. In SECTION 5,1 show that in all "ordinal" potential games (a broader class than
weighted potential games) as well as all games with identical interests, all minimal inclusive sets
will be singletons consisting of strict equilibria (subject again to the genericity of payoffs).
Lastly, Kandori and Rob (1992) identify a class of symmetric two player games in which
their evolutionary model (Kandori and Rob (1992a) following Foster and Young (1990) and
Kandori, Malaith and Rob (1992a)) will converge in the particular sense they specify (see
discussion in SECTION 6, infra). These are games with "bandwagon effects," wherein the benefit
of switching to a given action is greatest when all others are using that action. In SECTION 6,1
show that in almost all such games, all minimal inclusive sets are singletons consisting of pure
equilibria.
2. Definitions
Fix a game G = (Al,...,An; 7r^...,7rn), where for each player /, A, is z's finite set of
actions and 7rj:Alx...xAn->'iR is f s payoff function. Let T denote the set of all such games.
For any subset £_, c; A_t of opponent action profiles,12 let ME_J) denote the set of all
probability measures i//_t on A_t (with the power set as a -algebra) with y/_j(E_j) - 1. Extend
ni to an expected payoff function uj:Ai x A(A_,)-> SI in the usual manner. The set of (stage
game) best responses for player i to the belief y/_i e A(^_f.) is, as usual,
The set of (stage game) best responses for player i to beliefs on any subset E_t cz A_t is
Based on these definitions we may define a type of subset of action profiles that includes
all best responses to itself.
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DEFINITION 1 [Inclusive and Exact Sets; Basu and Weibull (1990)]: A non empty subset of
action profiles E = Exx.. .xEn c A is (best response) inclusive, if and only if
bj ° A(2?_,.) C EJ , all i.. The set E is exact if £, o A(£_,) = £ ; , all i.
EXAMPLE 1 [Some Familiar Inclusive Sets]: In any given game G, the whole set of profiles A is
inclusive as is the set of rationalizable profiles (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)). Any strict
Nash equilibrium, regarded as a singleton, is inclusive, but Nash equilibria that are not strict are
not inclusive. GAME 1, infra, has three inclusive sets, the whole set of profiles and the two strict
equilibria taken as singletons.
REMARK 1 ["Exclusive" Sets]: Inclusive sets should be distinguished from what we might, by
symmetry, call "exclusive sets:" that is, sets with the reverse inclusion E^b^ A(E_j), all /.
Such subsets "exclude" all profiles that are "never best response" on E. An exact set is both
inclusive and exclusive. All equilibria, whether or not they are strict, are exclusive sets when
regarded as singletons. Moreover, the set of rationalizable profiles is the largest exclusive set
(Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)) and hence the largest exact set as well. The whole set of
profiles may not be exact or exclusive.
There is an interesting duality between inclusive and exclusive sets, as laid out in
Sanchirico (1994). While inclusive sets are closed under intersection, exclusive sets are closed
under (factorwise) union. Hence, for every subset of profiles there is a smallest inclusive set
containing that subset as well as a largest exclusive set contained in that set. Lastly, while this
smallest containing inclusive set may be found by a process of iterated addition of best responses
(starting from the contained subset), the largest contained exclusive set may be found by a
process of iterated elimination of never best responses.
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DEFINITION 2 [Minimal Inclusive Sets]: An inclusive set I is minimal if it contains no other
inclusive set I' * I.
EXAMPLE 2 [Examples of Minimal Inclusive Sets; Cooperative versus Competitive]:
One's first guess might be that minimal inclusive sets are small in games with much common
interest and large in games that exhibit conflict. The only minimal inclusive sets in GAME 1, for
instance, are the two pure equilibria, while the entire set of profiles is minimal in the familiar
zero-sum game, matching pennies. But the intuition is generally false. Some games that seem to
exhibit a large degree of "common interest" have large minimal inclusive sets. In GAME 2, for
instance, the entire set of profiles is minimal inclusive, though the two players have a strong
mutual interest in playing (P, P). Inversely, games of "pure conflict" may have small minimal
inclusive sets. GAME 3, "Augmented Matching Pennies" is a zero sum game (in which all
profiles are rationalizable) whose only minimal inclusive set is its unique pure equilibrium,
After the requisite definitions, I provide the fairly straightforward argument that serves as
a "template" for the succeeding results on the specific classes of games considered in the
following sections.
DEFINITION 3 [Restriction of Game to a Subset of Action Profiles]: Let G = (A,TT) be a
finite game. Let E be a rectangular subset of A. The restriction of G to E,, denoted GE is
the finite normal form with strategy sets Ei and payoffs ni E .
DEFINITION 4 [Restrictability to Inclusive Sets]: Let P be a property defined on games in
F . The property P is restrictable to inclusive sets, if for all games G with the property and
all inclusive sets I in G, the restriction G7 of G to I also has the property.
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EXAMPLE 3: The property: "has no more than one (pure strategy13) equilibrium" is restrictable
to inclusive sets, since all equilibria in the restriction of G to an inclusive set are equilibria in G
as well.
This property is not, however restrictable to general subsets of profiles. For example,
GAME 3 has one pure equilibrium, yet in the restriction of GAME 3 to {M, 5} x [M, R], both
diagonal profiles are pure equilibria.
The property "has no less than one (pure) equilibrium" is not restrictable even to
inclusive sets. Again considering GAME 3, if the "l/2'"s and "-1/2"' are replaced by zeros, then
the whole game would have one pure equilibrium, (B,R), but the restriction of the game to
{T, M] x {Z, M} , now an inclusive set, has no pure equilibrium.
REMARK 2: The property P can, of course, be the conjunction or disjunction of several
properties.
THEOREM 1 [Template]: If all games with the property P have (pure strategy) Nash
equilibria, and P is restrictable to inclusive sets, then in all games with P for which all pure
equilibria are strict, all minimal inclusive sets are singletons consisting of strict equilibria.
Proof: Let G have property P as well as the property, call it P', that all its (pure) equilibria are
strict. Consider any minimal inclusive set / for G. Since both P and P' are restrictable to
inclusive sets, the restriction of G to /, G7, has a strict equilibrium, a. Since / is inclusive, a
must also be a strict equilibrium for G. But all strict equilibria, as singletons, are inclusive sets.
Therefore, since / is minimal, it must consist solely of this equilibrium, a.
REMARK 3: It is clear from the proof that the property in the statement of the theorem need only
be restrictable to minimal inclusive sets.
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3. Minimal Inclusive Sets and Mixed Equilibria
As a first application of the general result, I consider the class of games whose "mixed
extensions" have the property that the support of every equilibrium contains a pure equilibrium.
This class includes games whose mixed extensions have only pure equilibria. But, as Gul,
Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) have shown, all generic games with more than one equilibrium have
a non degenerate mixed equilibrium. Hence, this latter class is essentially the same as the class
of games whose mixed extensions have a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. This includes,
for example, the zero sum GAME 3, supra.
Along the way to the main result, I consider the general relationship between mixed
equilibria (in the mixed extension) and minimal inclusive sets.
DEFINITION 5 [Mixed Extension of Finite Game]: The mixed extension of game G is the
(non finite) game G' =(A' ,/rf) with action spaces Al = A(Aj) and payoff functions n\
defined from ni via the usual expected utility calculation. The mixed extension of a
rectangular subset of action profiles E c A in the finite game G is the subset
of A'.
REMARK 4 [Definition of Inclusive Sets for Mixed Extension]: The definition of "inclusive set,"
"exact set" and "minimal inclusive set" are readily extended to the mixed extension.
Mixed equilibria and minimal inclusive sets are obviously related by the fact that if a
mixed extension of a minimal inclusive set contains a (mixed) equilibrium of (the mixed
extension of) G, then the support of that equilibrium must of course be contained in that minimal
inclusive set. However, two complications make the connection between the support of mixed
equilibria and minimal inclusive sets less than straightforward.
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EXAMPLE 4 [Mixed Extension of Minimal Inclusive Set in G is Not Necessarily Minimal
Inclusive in Mixed Extension of G]: Consider any subset E of action profiles in the finite game
G Consider, next, for any player /, the support of the set of best responses to the mixed
extension of E, E', in the mixed extension of G which we might denote as supp bi ° A £_, .
Clearly, this is equal to the set of best responses to E_t in the finite game, bi ° A(2s_,-). However,
the mixed extension of bt o A(E_j) may strictly contain bi o A £_, . For example, two (pure)
strategies may be in bt o A(E_j) because they are best responses to two different opponent
profiles in E_f. There is then no reason to believe that any given mixture of these two profiles is
best response to any belief on £_,.
From this fact arises the possibility that the mixed extension of a minimal inclusive set
may not necessarily be minimal inclusive. Consider, for example, the zero sum game, GAME 3
(Augmented Matching Pennies). Modify the game slightly by replacing the "0" payoff in the
southeastern most cell with a " 1 . " Then the entire set of profiles is minimal inclusive. But Row,
for example, would never want to mix T and M with equal weight, since B dominates this mixed
strategy. Therefore, the mixed extension of the entire set of profiles cannot be minimal inclusive.
EXAMPLE 5: As noted an inclusive set will contain the support of any mixed equilibrium in its
mixed extension. However, the mixed extension of a minimal inclusive set may contain more
than one mixed equilibrium. Non-generic examples are trivial to construct. For a robust
example, consider GAME 4. It is easy to check that the game has no pure equilibria and the only
inclusive set is the entire set of profiles. Hence, the game has one minimal inclusive set. Yet the
mixed profiles ({l + {2,yl + ^ 2) and (y3 + y4,y3 + y4) are both equilibria.
Nevertheless, it is possible to make several interesting statements about the relationship
between mixed equilibria and minimal inclusive sets.
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LEMMA 1 [Fewer Minimal Inclusives than Mixed Equilibria; Based in Part on Basu and
Weibull (1990)]: There are no more minimal inclusive sets in G than there are mixed
equilibria in G 's mixed extension.
Proof: First, I work with the mixed extension and establish a one to one map from the mixed
extension's minimal inclusive sets to its mixed equilibria. Next, I establish a one to one map
from the minimal inclusive sets of the finite game to the minimal inclusive sets of the mixed
extension. The existence of the composite one to one map proves the result.
Consider the mixed extension G', of G. As noted by Basu and Weibull (1990), each
compact inclusive set in G' contains, by the usual fixed point argument, a Nash equilibrium of
the mixed extension G'. Basu and Weibull (1990) also show that every minimal inclusive set
/ ' in G' is exact. From this it follows that every minimal inclusive set in G' is compact and
therefore contains an equilibrium. Now minimal inclusive sets must be disjoint, since inclusive
sets are closed under intersection. Hence, no equilibrium for G' is contained in more than one
minimal inclusive set in G'. Therefore, there are no more minimal inclusive sets in the mixed
extension G' than there are mixed equilibria therein.
To show that this implies that the same holds for the finite game G, it suffices to show
that the set of minimal inclusive sets in G can be mapped one to one into the set of minimal
inclusive sets in G'. Take any minimal inclusive set / in the finite game G. Consider the mixed
extension, /'of/. While / ' is not necessarily minimal inclusive, it is easy to show that it must at
least be inclusive. Since it is also compact, it must contain a minimal inclusive set / ' in G', as
shown by Basu and Weibull (1991). In this manner we associate each minimal inclusive set in G
with one minimal inclusive set in G'. Since minimal inclusive sets in G are disjoint, it follows
that this association must be one to one.
It is trivial that minimal inclusive sets exist in all finite games. One simply starts with the
whole set of profiles (an inclusive set) and then proceeds to smaller and smaller inclusive sets
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until the process stops. Hence, as a solution concept, minimal inclusive sets do not have the
existence problem of Nash equilibrium, which originally inspired resort to concept of a mixed
strategy. (Of course, minimal inclusive sets need not be singletons.) LEMMA 1 may be
interpreted as showing that minimal inclusive sets have no worse a multiplicity problem than
mixed equilibria.
The main result in this section follows more easily than LEMMA 1.
COROLLARY 1 [Sufficient Condition for Singleton Minimal Inclusive Sets]: If, in the mixed
extension ofG, the support of every mixed equilibrium contains a pure equilibrium and all
pure equilibria are strict, then these pure equilibria, as singletons, are G's only minimal
inclusive sets.
Proof [Using THEOREM 1 (Template)]: The assumption implies the existence of a pure
equilibrium in G's mixed extension and any pure equilibrium for G's mixed extension is an
equilibrium for G itself. Hence, all that remains for application of THEOREM 1 (Template) is
to show that the property, "the support of each of the mixed extension's mixed equilibria
contains a pure equilibrium," is restrictable to inclusive sets. But because of the definition
of inclusive set, any mixed equilibrium for the mixed extension of the restriction of G to an
inclusive set /--call this game G7 —is as well an equilibrium for the mixed extension G' of
G. Moreover, if a profile is not a pure equilibrium in G7 , then it is certainly not a pure
equilibrium in G'. Hence, if G7 contained a mixed equilibrium with no pure equilibrium
in its support, the same would be true of G', contradicting our assumption.
REMARK 5 [Strict Pure Equilibria weaker than Generic Payoffs]: The property that all pure
equilibria are strict is generic in the space of all finite games. (See, e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991), Chapter 12)
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4. Supermodular games
As mentioned in the introduction, Krishna (1991) shows that in the subclass of
supermodular games in which strategy spaces are completely ordered and there are "diminishing
increasing differences," the empirical frequency of play converges to one of the games (possibly)
mixed equilibria. The subclass of supermodular games that I consider here is not logically
related to Krishna's. The class includes some games in which strategy spaces are not completely
ordered, but only games in which all pure equilibria are strict.14
We start by reminding the reader of Milgrom and Roberts' (1990) definition of
supermodular games. For a full definition, please see that paper.
DEFINITION 6 [Supermodular Finite Games; Milgrom and Roberts (1990)]: A finite game
G whose action sets At are partially ordered15 is supermodular, if and only if16:
i) ( 4 , - / ) ls a complete lattice17, all i.
ii) n. is supermodular18 in ai
iii) ni has increasing differences19 in at and a_j.
REMARK 6 [Discussion of Supermodular Games]: If strategy spaces are completely ordered,
then they are complete lattices. Moreover, the requirement that ni be supermodular becomes
vacuous, and the class of supermodular games collapses into those with "strategic
complementarities," as enforced by the requirement of "increasing differences:" that is, games in
which players best responses increase (in the specified complete ordering) in the strategies of
their opponents. In the broader class of supermodular games the requirement that players'
strategy spaces are completely ordered is relaxed to the requirement that they be complete
lattices. Added is the condition that nt be supermodular in a, on this complete lattice —
roughly, that the dimensions of players' strategy spaces are complementary "inputs" in producing
payoffs. (See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for more discussion.)
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The next step is to define the subclass of supermodular games that are restrictable to
inclusive sets. The only part of the definition of supermodularity that poses a problem is the
requirement that action spaces be complete lattices. A subset of a complete lattice is not
necessarily a complete lattice in its own right. (The subset {(0,1), (1,0)} of the complete lattice
{(0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1)} with the (restriction of the) usual ordering on 912 is not a complete lattice
since, e.g., it fails to contain an upper bound for itself). Hence, the following definition:
DEFINITION 7 [Complete Lattice in Own Right]: Let (S,>) be a partially ordered set. A
subset T of S is a complete lattice in its own right, if T coupled with the restriction of >to T
(i.e. > n [ r x T]) is a complete lattice.
LEMMA 2 [Restriction of Supermodular Game]: Let G be a finite supermodular game. Let
E be a rectangular subset of profiles in A. If each Ei is a complete lattice in its own right,
then the restriction ofGtoE is a supermodular game.
Proof: Each £ ; is a complete lattice by assumption and the other requirements in the
definition of supermodular games clearly survive restriction to E.
REMARK 7: A stronger assumption for this lemma would be that Ai is a complete sublattice of
( 4 , < ; ) . (See Milgrom and Roberts (1990)).
DEFINITION 8 [Restrictable Supermodular Games]: In light of LEMMA 2, a supermodular
game is restrictable, if for all inclusive sets I, each /,., is a complete lattice in its own right.
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Milgrom and Roberts (1990) THEOREM 5 shows that all supermodular games have pure
equilibria. In particular, such games admit both a largest and a smallest "serially undominated
strategy," and these will be pure equilibria. It then follows immediately from THEOREM 1
(Template):
COROLLARY 2 [To Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Theorem 5]: IfG is a finite, restrictable
supermodular game all of whose pure equilibria are strict, then all minimal inclusive sets in
G are singletons consisting of strict equilibria.
REMARK 8: Actually, one can prove a bit more, namely: every minimal inclusive set that is a
complete lattice in its own right is a singleton consisting of a pure equilibrium.20
Since any subset of a completely ordered set is also completely ordered, we obtain:
COROLLARY 3 [Games with Completely Ordered Action Spaces]: IfG is a finite
supermodular game with completely ordered action spaces and all ofG 's pure equilibria
are strict, then all ofG's minimal inclusive sets are singletons consisting of strict equilibria.
EXAMPLE 6 [Supermodular Games whose Minimal Inclusive Sets are not Complete Lattices in
Their Own Right]: In the full class of supermodular games, even those with generic payoffs,
minimal inclusive sets can be quite large. Consider a two player game in which players choose
strategies along two dimensions, each dimension containing two choices. Let the choices for
both players be the pairs [a = (0,l),6 = (0,l),c-= (0fl),d = (1,1)} , and endow this set with usual
product ordering on $R2, so that, for example, d is the largest element, c, the smallest and a and b
are unrelated. Then both player's strategy spaces are complete lattices.
Assign payoffs to the players as in GAME 5. (Zeros are not shown). Then payoffs are
supermodular for both players: fixing any column, for instance, we see that the sum of payoffs to
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Row for a and b are never greater than the sum of her payoffs for c and d. In addition, both
players' payoffs have increasing dif and only iferences: the benefit to Row (perhaps negative) of
increasing his strategy from a to d, for instance, is no less when Column plays d then when
column plays a,b or c.
Therefore, the game is supermodular. However, the subset of profiles {a,b} x [a,b] is
minimal inclusive. Moreover, the example is robust to changes in payoffs.
5. Potential Games, Congestion Games and Games with Identical Interests
Ordinal, weighted and exact potential games as well as games with identical interests
were introduced to the literature on learning in two recent papers, Monderer and Shapley (1993a
and b). The former paper proves a convergence result for fictitious play in games with identical
interests. The latter defines the three nested types of potential games, shows that the class of
games with identical interests includes the middle type, weighted potential games, and proves the
equivalence of the smallest class, exact potential games to Rosenthal's (1973) "congestion
games." Congestion games model situations wherein each of a group of players must travel from
one node to another on a graph, with different starting points and destinations for each. The
players choose which path to take and the payoffs to each driver depend on the number of other
players that also use the branches along the path she chooses. Monderer and Shapley do not
provide an interpretation for the broader classes of ordinal and weighted potential games,
preferring to view the classes solely as helpful mathematical classifications. I first consider
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DEFINITION 9 [Ordinal Potential Function and Game; Monderer and Shapley (1993b)]: A
function P: A -> SR is an ordinal potential for the finite normal form game G = (A,n), if for
every player i and every a_f e A_s
yai,aieAi 7ri(ai,a_i)-7ri(dfi,a_i)>0, iff P(ai,a_i)- P{ai,a_i) > 0 (3)
The game G is an ordinal potential game if it admits an ordinal potential function.
The authors define two (nested) subclasses of such games:
DEFINITION 10 [Weighted Potential Function and Game; Monderer and Shapley (1993b)]:
Let w — (wl,..., wn) e $R"+ be a vector of positive weights. A function P: A —> SR is a w-
potential for the finite normal form game G = [A, n), if for every player i and every
Va,.,a, e Ai nt(a,,a_,)- n,(at,a_f) = wi( P(a,,a_,)- P(at,a_t)) (4)
The game G is a w-potential game if it admits a w-potential function. When not interested
in the identity of the weights, we say that such P is a weighted potential function and such G,
a weighted potential game.
As noted by Monderer and Shapley (1993b), the class of weighted potential games is a
subclass of the class of games with identical interests, considered below.
DEFINITION 11 [Exact Potential Game; Monderer and Shapley (1993b)]: A function
P: A -^ 9? is an (exact) potential for the finite normal form game G = (A, TZ) , if it is a w-
potential for G with weight wt, = 1, for all i. The game G is an (exact) potential game it is
admits an exact potential function.
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As noted by Monderer and Shapley (1993b) COROLLARY 2.2, all finite ordinal potential
games have (pure) equilibria. In particular, a profile that maximizes the potential function will
be an equilibrium. Moreover, it is clear from the definition of ordinal potential games that the
property defining such games is restrictable to inclusive sets (indeed to all subsets). Then from
THEOREM 1 (Template) all ordinal potential games (hence all weighted and exact potential
games) whose pure equilibria are strict have singleton minimal inclusive sets:
COROLLARY 3 [Minimal Inclusive Sets are Singletons in Ordinal Potential Games]: IfG is
a finite ordinal potential game in which all pure equilibria are strict, then every minimal
inclusive set in G is a singleton consisting of a strict Nash equilibrium.
5.2. Games with Identical Interests
A game with identical interests is simply one whose "best response regions" correspond
to those of a game with identical payoffs. Formally,
DEFINITION 12 [Best Response Equivalence in Mixed Strategies; Monderer and Shapley
(1993a)]: The game G = [A, TI) is best response equivalent in mixed strategies to the game
G' = (A',TT') , if A = A' and for every player i and every belief/opponent mixed strategy,
{//_! eA(A_j), bj(y/_j) = bl(i//_t)9 where, naturally, b\ denotes i's best response
correspondence in G'.
DEFINITION 13 [Fully Symmetric]: A game G = (A,7r) is fully symmetric, if Vz * j ,
At = Aj and ni = TTJ .
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DEFINITION 14 [Games with Identical Interests]: The normal form G is a game with
identical interests, if it is best response equivalent in mixed strategies to some fully
symmetric game.
As noted by Monderer and Shapley (1993a), p.9, all games with identical interest have
(pure) equilibria. (Use the payoff function in the equivalent fully symmetric game as an ordinal
potential function.) Moreover, it is clear from the definition of inclusive sets, that if G is best
response equivalent in mixed strategies to the fully symmetric G, then G7 is best response
equivalent in mixed strategies to G7. Hence, the property defining games with identical interests
is restrictable to inclusive sets (though it is not restrictable to general subsets). Once again
applying THEOREM 1 yields:
COROLLARY 4 [All Minimal Inclusives are Singletons in Games with Identical Interests]: If
G is a game with identical interests, and all its pure equilibria are strict, then all its minimal
inclusive sets are singletons consisting of strict Nash equilibria.
6. Games with Bandwagon Effects
Kandori, Malaith and Rob (1992) and Kandori and Rob (1992a), following Foster and
Young (1990), consider an evolutionary model in which a fixed finite population of players are
repeatedly and randomly paired to play a given finite two player stage game. The process takes
the form of a Markov chain whose state vector is the number of players in the population using
each (pure) strategy in the stage game. Transition probabilities are determined by two factors.
The first is myopic best response play with "inertia." Players "tend" to take the same action this
period as they did last period. But there is always some fixed probability that each member of
the population will instead choose an action that is best response to the population distribution of
actions taken last period. The second factor is "mutation." In each period there is some small
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probability that any given member of population switches to any given action, whether or not it
is best response to last period's population distribution. For each set of parameters, the resulting
Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution. Taking the limit of this distribution as the
probability of mutation goes to zero gives the "limit distribution." The "long run states" are
those which receive positive probability thereunder.
For general games this Markov process will not necessarily converge in the sense that the
limit distribution will not put unit weight on one state. However, in Kandori and Rob (1992b),
the authors identify a class of two player symmetric games wherein the only long run state is one
in which everyone in the population plays some Nash equilibrium. These are games with the
"marginal bandwagon property." Such games are meant to reflect situations in which "the value
of a technology to one user depends on how many others are adopting it." The helpful example
carried throughout the paper concerns the choice of personal computer among individual faculty
in an economics department. A given professor is better off choosing to order a Macintosh, for
example, if all his colleagues have done the same. The formal bandwagon property is captured
in the following definition. Since definition is for symmetric two player games only, I simplify
notation by dropping the player subscripts and writing n{a,a) for the payoff of the player
playing the first strategy, a, in the pair:
DEFINITION 15 [Marginal Bandwagon Property; Kandori and Rob (1992b)]: A two player,
finite and symmetric game G has the marginal bandwagon property, if and only if for all
actions a,a',a" eA s.t. a^a' and a^a"
7r(a,a)-7r(a',a)>7r(a,a")-7r(af,a") (5)
REMARK 9 [Comparison with Increasing Differences and Supermodular Games]: Contrast the
marginal bandwagon property with the property of increasing differences used in defining
supermodular games. Increasing differences says that, given the ordering on strategy spaces, the
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"larger" your opponent's strategy, the greater the benefit of "increasing" your own strategy. The
marginal bandwagon property says that the benefit of switching to a given strategy (whether that
be an increase or a decrease) is (strictly) greatest when your opponents are using that strategy as
well. A two player, three strategy game with (1,1) on the main diagonal and (0,0) elsewhere has
the marginal bandwagon property but, one can show that it can not exhibit increasing differences
for any pair of partial orderings (which are, by definition, antisymmetric) on the strategy spaces.
Mathematically, the marginal bandwagon property has the very strong implication that if
an action a' "beats" a against a itself (n(a,a)-n(a\a) < 0), then it beats a against every
other (pure) action as well, since then n(a,a")-n(a',a") < 0 a and action a" is chosen
independently of a and a'. In short, if an action beats a against itself, then it strictly dominates
a. The contrapositive of this assertion is that if a is undominated, then it must be a symmetric
(pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.21 Since every game contains some undominated strategy, we
have that every game with the marginal bandwagon property contains a pure and strict
equilibrium. Moreover, the marginal bandwagon property is, on its face, restrictable to inclusive
sets (indeed to all sets). Therefore, THEOREM 1 (Template) is again applicable.
It should be noted that even though the definition of the marginal bandwagon property
uses strict inequality, not all pure equilibria need be strict: consider the two by two symmetric
game in which the players choose H or T and all payoffs are 1 except when the player is alone in
choosing H, in which he gets -1. This game has the marginal bandwagon property, but H,H is a
nonstrict pure equilibrium.22
COROLLARY 5 [Generic Games with Marginal Bandwagon Property have All Singleton
Minimal Inclusive Sets]: If G is a generic game with the marginal bandwagon property
(and is therefore symmetric and two player), then all minimal inclusive sets in G are
singletons consisting of strict Nash equilibria.
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Proof: First I show that every game with bandwagon effects contains a pure equilibrium. Take
any undominated action a . For all strategies a' there exists a third strategy a" s.t.
7r(a,a")-7r(a',a") > 0. If a"* a, the marginal bandwagon property gives
7r(a,a)-7r(a',a)> 7r(a,a")-7r(a',a"). In either case, n(a,a)-n[a\a) >0 . The action a'
having been chosen arbitrarily, and G being symmetric, (a,a) must be a pure equilibrium.
Since it is clear that the marginal bandwagon property is restrictable to inclusive sets, the
result follows the same reasoning as in THEOREM 1.
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11 would like to thank Luca Anderlini, Truman Bewley, Margaret Bray, Subir Bose, Joseph
Chang, Jonathan Conning, John Geanakoplos, Caroline Gentile, Henry Hansmann, Al Klevorick,
Sujoy Mukerji, Roger Myerson, Thomas Nyiro, Rafael Rob, Susan Rose-Ackerman, members of
the Game Theory Reading Group at Yale, participants of the 1994 Summer Workshop of the
Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE), the 1994 North American Summer
Meetings of the Econometric Society, and the Olin Summer Workshop at Yale Law School for
their helpful comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Phil Reny for an especially useful
conversation on potential games. Special thanks go to David Pearce for his advice and
encouragement.
2Such research includes (but is not limited to) Crawford (1992), Foster and Young (1990),
Fudenberg and Kreps (1988 and 1992), Fudenberg and Levine (1993a and b), Gul (1991), Jordan
(1991b), Kalai and Lehrer (1993), Kandori, Malaith and Rob (1992), Kandori and Rob (1992a),
Krishna (1991), Li Calzi (1992), Milgrom and Roberts (1991), Monderer and Shapley (1993a
and b), Nyarko (1992a), Sanchirico (1993).
3The model is set in the usual repeated game framework, but the two key assumptions are stated
in terms of the likelihood of beliefs and actions conditional on the history of play. The model
shows how convergence of belief and action may follow from the interaction of two seemingly
unrelated "forces," both of which seem present in real world interaction. The first force consists
of the feedback produced when certain types of histories, "inclusive sets," are subjected to the
assumption that the more often a subset of stage game profiles has been played in, the more
likely it is to be "salient" in players' beliefs regarding play in the incipient stage game. A subset
of action profiles is "salient" at t when players believe either that their opponents will play again
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in (their factors of) that subset, or that their opponents believe that their opponents will do so, or
etc...up to any order. Whenever an inclusive set of actions is salient (and players are sufficiently
impatient), it will in fact be played in. This will then make it more likely to be salient again in
the following period—hence the feedback. The second force, "entropy," is a best response based
noise assumption designed to reflect the indeterminacy of rational strategic interaction (c.f.
rationalizability). The actual assumption requires that every best response to "recent" history be
at least possible in the incipient stage game.
4Basu and Weibull (1990) call inclusive sets "strategy subsets closed under rational behavior" or
"CURB'"s for short. Minimal inclusive sets are then "minimal curbs." I chose a simpler
terminology which serves to emphasize the duality between inclusive sets and "excusive sets,"
which are defined with the reverse inclusion. (See REMARK 1, infra.)
5Minimal inclusive sets will always be contained in the set of rationalizable profiles.
6An equilibrium is strict if deviation always leads to strictly lower payoffs.
'Following Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).
8Roughly, a sequence of action profiles is consistent with sophisticated learning if each player
always plays a best response to "recent" history, where for every time t there comes a point after
which it is no longer part of what is considered recent.
9In fictitious play, the probability that each player places on each of his opponents taking a given
action at time t is assumed equal to the proportion of times in the past that his opponent has taken
that action. Players then play myopic best responses to these beliefs. See Fudenberg and Kreps
(1992) for a helpful discussion of the properties of this learning rule.
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10That is, without "ties" in the payoff matrix. Actually, it suffices that all pure equilibria are
strict.
nI thank Phil Reny for bringing these papers to my attention and posing the question of how
small minimal inclusive sets might be in such games.
12As usual, given any product Jf,xK xXn, Xdenotes the product itself, x-t denotes the zth factor,
and X-i denotes the product of all factors except the zth. Subsets of, or measures on, such
products receive the same subscripting for convenient reference.
13So far, I have only defined the finite game and so this qualification is superfluous. In the next
section, I consider the game's mixed extension. To avoid confusion, I will often refer to the
equilibria of the finite game as "pure" equilibria. Moreover, when in subsequent sections I refer
to "mixed" equilibria of the mixed extension, I will mean to include pure equilibria, as well,
viewing them as "degenerate" mixed strategies.
14
 But note that Krishna resolves ties in fictitious play by assuming that players play the largest
best response.
15A partial ordering is transitive, reflexive and antisymmetric (x>yAy>x=>x = y, where the
equality means "same point" not the conjunction of the two conditions). The antisymmetry
requirement in the definition of a partial ordering insures that we can not make every game
supermodular by simply setting all profiles equal (in the sense of x >yAy > x) in the ordering.
16Milgrom and Roberts (1990) also impose the condition "order continuity," This condition is
vacuous in finite games.
17That is, the relation is a partial ordering and A, contains the least upper bound and greated
lower bound of every one of its subsets, where, e.g., the least upper bound (lub) of a subset S of a
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set X is an element in X which is "greater than" all elements in S and "less than" all elements wX
with the same property.
18
 That is, Vai,a! eAi,a-i eA-i, /r,-(a/,a_/) + /r,(a/,a ,) < ;r,(glb{a,,a/},a-/) + 7r, (lubja,, a/}, a-,).
1 9
 T h a t i s , <2j >,- al AO-; >--, a'-i => Ki{ai,a-j)- 7tj{a'i ,a-i)> ^(ai,a'-i)- mya!,aLj).
20Take any minimal inclusive set, /. Since / is exact, it is rectangular. Suppose that each /, is a
complete lattice in its own right. The restriction of G to / will be a supermodular game by
LEMMA 2. Milgrom and Roberts' (1990) Theorem 5 then guarantees that the largest and smallest
profiles in the restricted game which survive the iterated elimination (from I) of strategies strictly
dominated on point beliefs over / will be pure strategy Nash equilibria. Then since all pure
equilibria are strict, /will contain a strict Nash equilibrium (rel. the restricted game). Since / is
inclusive in G, this equilibrium will also be a strict equilibrium for G. Hence, since / is minimal
in G, it must consist solely of this equilibrium.
2
'This argument also shows that the marginal bandwagon property implies the "total bandwagon
property" (also defined in the same paper) for undominated strategies. Cf. the assertion on p. 6
that "TBP and MBP are not nested assumptions."
22
 An earlier version of this paper made this assertion erroneously.
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